The ongoing special military operation, which has lasted for a year and eight months, has revealed numerous issues in both the structure of the Russian Armed Forces and the tactics of troop deployment in the current setup.

These problems are widely acknowledged, prompting appropriate decisions from top officials. These decisions are primarily guided by common sense:

▪️ With the establishment of the Leningrad and Moscow military districts, the Northern Fleet Operational Command will no longer exist. Ground units will be placed under the control of the Leningrad Military District.

▪️ Neither Chaiko nor Dvornikov will be approved for the positions of new commanders. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief has decided that the commanders should be "young" and selected from among "honored generals who have successfully completed SMO".

▪️ The current commander of the Western Military District, Nikiforov, has a 95% chance of leading the Moscow Military District.

▪️ All fleets will be removed from the military districts and placed directly under the command of the Navy's High Command.

▪️ The air defense forces will have their own Main Command.

This is not an exhaustive list of the changes that lie ahead for the Russian Armed Forces. These processes will commence on December 1, 2023, and personnel transfers will take place in the first quarter of 2024.

The need to review the structure and approaches to fleet and air defense force utilization has long been overdue. We will witness to what extent these changes will optimize the functioning of the Russian Armed Forces and elevate them to a new level of quality next year.

Sources: DiplNet - News Agency